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I Introduction
One day, Leslie walks into her local attorney's office and declares that she
wants to start a sole proprietorship selling shoes. Unfortunately, due to a
teenage spending habit, Leslie does not have enough money to start the
business on her own. Leslie needs funding and wants to know the legal
consequences of taking out a loan. Because of the current state of the
economny,' Leslie is concerned about what would happen if her shoe business
failed. Would she still need to pay back the loan? 2
1. See, e.g., Vikas BaJaj & Louise Story, Mortgage Crisis Spreads Beyond Subprime
Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at Al ("Personal bankruptcy filings, which fell significantly
after a 2005 federal law made it harder to wipe out debts in bankruptcy, are starting to inch
up."); Peter S. Goodman, Credit Enters a Lockdown, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at Al
("[M]any experts fear the fraying of the financial system could pin the nation in distress for
years."); David Leonhardt, Lesson fromt a Credit Crisis: When Trust Vanishes, Worry, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at AlI ("It's not enough that markets could freeze up, loans could become
impossible to get and the economy could slide into its worst downturn since the Great
Depression.").
2. The fact pattern used is drawn from a couple of different cases focusing on a common
§ 523(a)(6) injury to property scenario--a debtor owing money under a loan agreement unable
to make payments but still in possession of the creditor's property interest. See, e.g., In re
Gagle, 230 B.R. 174, 176-78 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999) (stating as facts ofthe case that the debtors
took out a $10,000 secured loan but that the debtor stopped making payments and sold off all
the value of the collateral so that the creditor had nothing in which to attach security interest); In
re Hambley, 329 B.R. 382, 3 88-94 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating as facts that the debtors
entered into a contract with investor-creditor under which the debtor was to receive cash
investment from the creditor but the debtors failed to return investment, as required by
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The lawyer's initial response, and probably what Leslie expects to hear, is
that honest, good faith debts that result from a failing business are discharged in
bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Code provides the entrepreneur with the incentive
to take on the risks of running a business by allowing the entrepreneur to erase
debt if the business fails.3 Several provisions of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code4
allow for individual entrepreneurs, like Leslie, to discharge debts when in need
of relief.5
The lawyer, however, cannot just inform Leslie that all debts, including
bank loans, are dischargeable.6 The discharge of debt is meant only for the
"honest but unfortunate debtor," 7 and in certain situations Congress provided
exceptions in which debts incurred by the debtor are not dischargeable.8 The
historical reason for keeping some debts on the books despite a bankruptcy
filing is to punish entrepreneurs for dishonest, unscrupulous behavior. 9 The
Code seeks to promote business and economic development by providing a
safety net for individuals, like Leslie, who try to run a successful business but
fail, while protecting creditors when entrepreneurs incur debt for explicitly
identified circumstances that Congress has deemed to be dishonest or unworthy
of discharge.'0
agreement, and instead continued to use the fu~nds at the expense of the creditor); In re Whiters,
337 B.R. 326, 350-53 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006) (stating as findings of fact that the debtor
entered into a refinancing agreement for debtor's vehicle and security agreement using vehicle
as collateral and that debtor, experiencing trouble making payments on the agreement,
transferred title of the agreement to a third party in breach of the security agreement).
3. See Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 379 (1966) ("[Olne purpose which is highly
prominent and relevant in this case is to leave the bankrupt free after the date of his petition to
accumulate new wealth in the future.").
4. See 11IU.S.C. §§ 727, 1141, 1128(a), 1328(b) (2006) (discharge provisions).
5. See id. § 727(b) ("Except as provided in section 523 of this Title, a discharge under
subsection (a) of this section discharges the debtor from all debts that arose before the date of
the order for relief under this chapter. . .. ")
6. See id. (using the language "[e]xcept as provided in section 523" to note that
exceptions to discharge exist other than those listed in section 727(a)).
7. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (commenting that bankruptcy
"gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which
he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt").
8. See 11IU.S.C. § 523 (2006) (listing all the exceptions to a discharge authorized by
§§ 727, 1141, 1128(a), and 1328(b)).
9. See Robert J. Bein, Subjectivity, Good Faith and the Expanded Chapter 13
Discharge,70 Mo. L. REv. 655,665 (2005) ("Continuing the historical emphasis on moralism,
the discharge exceptions are rooted in the fundamentally equitable nature of bankruptcy itself.").
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text (discussing the provision in the Local Loan
Co. decision that states that the purpose of bankruptcy is to provide the honest but unfortunate
debtor with a fresh start).
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lIn order to give Leslie a full rundown on the types of behavior that will
except debts from discharge, the lawyer must tell Leslie about I11 U. S.C.
§ 523(a)(6)." Section 523(a)(6) excepts debt from discharge "for willful and
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another
entity."'12 The exception seeks to "avoid rewarding debtors who engage in
blameworthy conduct by preventing them from escaping liability."'I For
example, under this provision, the debtor cannot discharge debts resulting from
a judgment entered against the debtor for intentional infliction of emotional
4

distress.'1

Avoiding § 523(a)(6) seems simple-avoid any wrongdoing. But Leslie
will want a more detailed explanation of "wrongdoing." How can one be sure
that debts incurred are debts resulting from wrongdoing?
Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge willful and malicious injuries to
both person and property.'15 A debt incurred due to a willful and malicious
injury to a person generally is a judgment entered against the debtor for an
6
intentional tort, such as battery, in which the victim becomes the creditor.'1
Section 523(a)(6) prevents the debtor in such a case from evading the judgment
by filing for bankruptcy.'17 To avoid incurring a debt from a willful and
malicious injury to a person, the lawyer must simply advise Leslie to be aware
8
of and avoid debts sustained due to past intentional torts.'1
11. See I11U. S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2006) (excepting from discharge those wrongful debts
caused by willful and malicious injury to the creditor or the creditor's property).

12. Id.
13. George M. Ahrend & Randall T. Thomsen, Tort Claims and Judgments asDebtsfor
"Willfuland Malicious Injury" Nondischargeable Under Section 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy
Code, 100 Com. L.J. 498, 498 (1995).
14. See In re McNallen, 62 F.3d 619, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that intentional
infliction of emotional distress injury was certainly willful). The court also noted that the son's
conduct pushed past the bounds of decency because it might have been done knowing that the
mother was susceptible to emotional distress. Id.

15.

11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (2006).

16. See, e.g., In re Halverson, 226 B.R. 22, 32 (Bankr. D. Mimn. 1998) (concluding that
debt tortfeasor incurred by battering, assaulting, and intentionally imprisoning the plaintiff was
willful and malicious under § 523(a)(6)).
17. See id. at 31 ("[Section] 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code stands for the proposition
that a debtor who has intentionally injured and intentionally harmed his creditor cannot expect
bankruptcy relief to include discharging his debt for such conduct .... )
18. Cf. Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61 (1998) (defining "willful" to include all
acts that intend to injure). Because "willful" requires intent to injure, when considering whether
their behavior will be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6), debtors need not concern
themselves with torts requiring anything less than such intent, such as recklessness or
negligence. See id. at 64 ("We hold that debts arising from recklessly or negligently inflicted
injuries do not fall within the compass of [§J 523(a)(6).").
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Debts incurred through willful and malicious acts that injure a person's
property, however, are more difficult to define.'19 Specifically, confusion arises
when applying the exception in breach of contract cases. For example, in In re
Hambley,2 the bankruptcy court excepted from discharge a debt created when
debtors refused to return the creditor's investment upon the occurrence of a
certain condition in a contract requiring the return of the investment .2 ' The
19.

See generally Andrea R. Blake, Debts Nondischargeablefor "Willful and Malicious

Injury":- Applicability of Bankruptcy Code § 523 (a)(6) in a CommercialSetting, 104 Com. L.J.
64 (1999) (discussing different viewpoints on when certain acts causing injury to property are
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6)); Michael D. DeFrank, An Ineffective EscapeHatch:
The Textual ist Mistake in Geiger, 16 BANKR. DEv. J. 467 (2000) (critiquing the Supreme Court's
decision in interpreting "willful"); Howard B. Kleinberg, When Does the "Willful and Malicious
Injury" Exception to DischargeApply to a Debt Stemming from a Conversion of Collateral?,
119 BANKING L.J. 87 (2002) (discussing when debts from a conversion of collateral are
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) in the wake of Kawaauhau).
20. In re Hambley, 329 B.R. 382, 389 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) (holding that $700,000
debt incurred due to breach of contract is nondischargeable under subsections (2), (4), and (6) of
§ 523(a)). in Hambley, the bankruptcy court considered whether debt created by the debtors'
breach of contract by failing to return the creditor's investment was excepted from discharge
under 11IU.S.C. § 523(a) when the debtors filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Id at 388-89.
Specifically, the debtors, owners of all the equity in a company that designed software to
address the so-called "Millennium Bug," were in need of investors for their business and falsely
represented the company's product and the amount it invested in the product in order to solicit
the creditor's business. Id. at 389-91. The creditor composed a preliminary agreement that
stated that the creditor's investment of $300,000 was subject to the parties reaching a final
agreement, and that if the parties did not reach a final agreement, the debtors were to return the
creditor's investment. Id. at 392. The creditor then forwarded $175,000, but the creditor and
debtors never reached a final agreement. Id. Instead of returning the money in compliance with
the preliminary agreement, the debtors continued to draw salaries on it and use it for business
and personal reasons, which reduced the creditor's money from $175,000 to $30,000. Id. at
392-93. The court found that debt caused due to the injury to the creditor's investment was
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2) because the debtors obtained money through false
pretenses, misrepresentation, and fraud. Id at 395-98. The court also found the debt incurred
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(2)(B) because the debtors obtained the creditor's
investment due to a materially false written statement respecting the debtors' financial
condition, finding the five necessary elements: (1) the debtors used the statement in writing;
(2) the writing the debtors used was materially false; (3) the materially false writing concerned
the debtors' financial condition; (4) the creditor reasonably relied on debtors' false statement;
and (5) the debtors caused the statement to be published with an intent to deceive. Id at 399400. The court also found the debt excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(4) because the
evidence produced at trial showed that the debtors' actions constituted embezzlement. Id. at
401. The court finally found the debt excepted from discharge under section § 523(a)(6)
because the debtors knew their acts that breached the preliminary contract caused the harm of
the investor not receiving the investment back, constituting a willful and malicious injury. Id. at
402. Therefore, the court excepted the debt from discharge when the debtors filed for Chapter 7
Bankruptcy. Id. at 403.
21. See id. at 393 (describing in detail the debtors' refusal to return the creditor's funds
upon the creditor's request, thereby violating the preliminary agreement under which the funds
were lent).
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court found the breach itself created a willful and malicious injury to the
creditor because in breaching the contract, the debtors (1) knew of their
obligation to return the investment if the contractual condition did not occur
and (2) continued to act in breach of contract by keeping the investment, which
caused the depreciation of that investment. 2
This means that courts, in evaluating whether a debtor's conduct was
"willful and malicious" under § 523(a)(6), will analyze the debtor's breaches of
contract to determine whether those breaches caused injury to property willfully
and maliciously. This may come as a complete surprise to the lawyer advising
Leslie, who has studied contract law, because, unlike tort law, contract law is
not based on the subjective intent of the parties to the contract.2 When dealing
with breaches of contract, courts focus on the manifestations of the contracting
parties when determining whether the breach is material.2
Because breach of contract cases focus on the actions of both parties, 25 no
clear definition in contract case law exists to help clarify when the intentions of
the party breaching the contract are so wrongful and dishonest that the breach
can be considered "willful and malicious.",26 Breach of contract alone is not
enough to qualify as a willful and malicious injury to property under
§ 523(a)(6). 2 ' The courts are not clear or unanimous, however, when deciding
what element is needed, in addition to breach of contract, to cause a willful and
malicious injury.2 8 While decisions on the subject focus on the bad faith intent
22. See id. at 402 ("The defendants had a contractual duty under the Heads of Agreement
to return the funds when they failed to enter into final contract. The defendants' failure to return
the money has injured the plaintiffs. The Court finds the defendants caused a willful and
malicious injury.").

23.

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 5(2) (1981) ("A term of a contract is

that portion of the legal relations resulting from the promise or set of promises which relates to a
particular matter, whether or not the parties manifest an intention to create those relations.").
24. See Frank J. Cavico, Jr., Punitive Damagesfor Breach of Contract-A Principled
Approach, 22 ST. MARY's L.J. 357,389(1990) ("Non-performance, withoutjustification, equals
a simple breach of contract which entitles the aggrieved party to pursue relief without the need
to prove that the breach was intentional, negligent, or otherwise wrongful.").
25. See Amy B. Cohen, Revising Jacob and Youngs, Inc. v. Kent: MaterialBreach
Doctrine Reconsidered, 42 VILL. L. REv. 65, 65-69 (1997) (discussing the qualifications
necessary for finding a material breach of contract).
26. But see Cavico, supra note 24, at 388-92 (discussing the difficulties in separating tort
and contract law when the plaintiff wants to sue on tort grounds for a cause of action arising out
of a breach of contract).
27. See, e.g., In re Wikel, 229 B.R. 6, 11 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998) ("Though the Plaintiff
argues that the Defendant's actions blatantly breached the security agreement, § 523(a)(6)
requires more than a knowing breach of contract." (citinglIn re Bullock-Williams, 220 B.R. 345,
347 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1998))).
28. CompareIn re Williams, 337 F.3d 504,510 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[A] knowing breach of
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of the debtor when breaching a contract, the court does not always require a
separate tort.2
Without clear authority explaining what constitutes a willful and malicious
breach of contract, court decisions interpreting § 523(a)(6) seem to rely not on
principles of settled law, but on the sentiments and inclinations of the judge
determining the case .30 This has created a mess of decisions, muddling law
with personal opinion. The result is a lack of certainty as each decision is
solely dependent on the facts of the case and the judge.'
Leslie's lawyer will struggle to identify "bad faith" breaches that are truly
willfuil and malicious under § 523(a)(6). As a result, Leslie might avoid using
the discharge safety valve that Congress created. Leslie might also decide not
to take out a loan because she does not know exactly what conduct will prevent
her debts from being discharged.3
The purpose of this Note is to look in depth at the problems discussed
above and to expose the confusion caused when § 523(a)(6)'s willfuil and
malicious requirement is applied to breaches of contract. Specifically, Part 11
explores the differences between contract law and tort law to flesh out the
difficulties caused when analysis of a debtor's intent is used to evaluate a
breach of contract. Part III analyzes the Supreme Court's failed attempt in
Kawaatuhauv. Geiger3 3 to clarify the confusion caused by § 523(a)(6)'s willful
a clear contractual obligation that is certain to cause injury may prevent discharge under
[§] 523(a)(6), regardless of the existence of separate tortious conduct.'), andIn re Smith, 160
B.R. 549, 552-53 (N.D. Tex. 1993) (requiring that the debtor injured intentionally a creditor
without an excuse, but not requiring "ill will or specific intent to do harm" to the creditor), with
In re Jercich, 238 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2001) ("An intentional breach of contract is
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) only when it is accompanied by malicious willful
and tortious conduct." (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Riso, 978 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cir.
1992))), andIn re Guillory, 285 B.R. 307,316 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002) ("[Wlhen an intentional
breach of contract is accompanied by tortious conduct which results in willful and malicious
injury, the resulting debt is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6).").
29. See, e.g., Smith, 160 B.R. at 553 ("[Section] 523(a)(6) does not mandate proof of an
independent, recognized tort, but instead requires only the showing that the debtor's actions
were willful and malicious, i.e., done intentionally and without just cause or excuse.").
30. See infra Part Ill (examining in detail the decisions of different jurisdictions when
applying the malice requirement of § 523(a)(6) to breach of contract scenarios).
31. See infra Part Ill (discussing the varying interpretations of willfuil and malicious and
the confusion that such interpretations created).
32. See infra Part III.D (discussing the problems created by the unclear case law
concerning what sort of breach of contract is considered willful and malicious).
33. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57,64 (1998) (holding that a debt arising from a
medical malpractice judgment attributable to negligent or reckless conduct does not fall within
the § 523(a)(6) exception, and, therefore, that the debt is dischargeable). In Geiger, the
Supreme Court considered whether "willfuil" under § 523(a)(6) encompassed injuries caused by
reckless or negligent actions. Id at 6 1. Specifically, a doctor prescribed the wrong drug for a
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and malicious injury terminology. Part Ul then investigates the application of
Geigerto breach of contract scenarios in various jurisdictions, concluding that
the Supreme Court effectively wrote "malicious" out of § 523(a)(6) and that
courts are excepting debts from discharge without basing their conclusions on
any legal standard or rule. Finally, Part IV suggests an alternative to the
traditional analysis: Require that an intentional tort accompany the breach of
contract and that such intentional tort be eligible for punitive damages under
state law.3 By requiring an independent tort eligible for punitive damages
before excepting such debt from discharge under § 523(a)(6), Leslie's lawyer
will have clearer, more assuring answers to articulate to Leslie when she is
deciding whether to take on debt.
H. Compatibility of Intent Analysis with ContractLaw
A. Comparisonof Conventional Contract and Tort Doctrines
In the conventional view, contracts and torts comprise separate and
distinct areas of law .35 The distinction between the two doctrines is based on
the respective duties contract and tort law impose.36 Contract law enforces
"duties ... created by the promises of parties,"3 7 while "tort duties are created
by the courts and imposed as rules of law."3 8 The focus in contract law is on
patient and recommended the wrong course of action for that patient, resulting in the patient's
loss of limb. Id at 59. The patient sued, won a malpractice suit, and, in this case, tried to
except the doctor from discharging the debt in bankruptcy under § 523(a)(6). Id. at 60. The
Court determined that "willful" required not only that the debtor be cognizant of the act being
done but also that the debtor intend the injury or be substantially certain that the injury will
occur. Id at 61-62. The Court concluded that although the doctor intended the medical advice
he gave to the patient, the doctor did not have the intent to harm the patient, and, therefore, the
malpractice judgment against the doctor was dischargeable. Id. at 64.
34. See infra Part IV (discussing a suggested solution to the lack of clarity surrounding
"willful and malicious" in a breach of contract scenario).
35. See DAN B. DOBBS, TH1m LAW OF TORTS § 3 (2000) (noting that the conventional view
holds that "the fields of tort and contract are entirely distinct").
36. See Cavico, supra note 24, at 360 ("Historically, the law has assigned different
objectives to tort and contract actions.").

37. DOBBS, supra note 35, § 3; see also ARTHuR LINTON CORBIN, CORBINON CONTRACTS
§ 1.1 (1952) ("That portion of the field of law that is classified and described as the law of
contracts attempts the realization of reasonable expectations that have been induced by the
making of a promise."); Cavico, supra note 24, at 361 ("Contract law serves society by
promoting standardized conduct in the performance ofpromises and produces certain, uniform,
stable, and efficient business transactions.").

38.

DOBBS, supra note

35, § 3.
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the promise that arises out of the agreements between the contracting parties,
whereas the focus in tort law is on the wrongs that result from violations of
court-created rules.3
It only seems logical that in order to enforce these distinct duties, contract
law and tort law contain distinct sets of remedies. In contract law, when a
promise between contracting parties is broken, the breaching party usually must
compensate the aggrieved party in order to "place the aggrieved party in the
same economic position the aggrieved party would have attained if the contract
had been performed." 4 0 Therefore, the main remedy available in contract law is
compensatory-recouping the economic injury suffered due to the breach of a
promise.4
In tort law, however, courts create the duties.4 The court decides what
acts constitute wrongs to individuals. 3 When someone is injured due to the
tortious actions of another party, the injured person is entitled to damages in an
attempt to make that person whole."4 This seems to be on par with contract
law's compensatory remedy.45 Tort law, however, also provides a second type
of damages, known as punitive damages-damages awarded to the tort victim
in order to punish the tortfeasor and deter others from similar behavior.4 Tort
39. See id ("[Tihe province of torts is wrongs and the province of contract is agreements
or promises.').
40. JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 14.4(a) (5th ed. 2003).
41. See id § 14.1 (stating that compensatory damages are the main form of contract
damages while noting that punitive and nominal damages play a small role). The role of
nominal damages in contract law is to award the aggrieved party a small amount of monetary
damages-that is, one dollar-to symbolize vindication of the wrong done and is awarded only
in those circumstances in which the aggrieved party suffered no compensable damages. Id.
§ 14.2. Punitive damages, awarded to punish and deter malicious, willful, or wanton conduct,
are usually not awarded in breach of contract actions, but have been awarded where: the breach
also involves the malicious or wanton violation of a fiduciary duty; the breach constitutes or is
accompanied by an independent malicious or wanton tort; or, in some jurisdictions, elements of
fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression mingle with the breach. Id. § 14.3.
42. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing the source of the duties
created in tort law and how such duties focus tort law on wrongful actions).
43. See DOBBS, supra note 35, § 1 ("[Tjorts are traditionally associated with wrongdoing
in some moral sense. In the great majority of cases today, tort liability is grounded in the
conclusion that the wrongdoer was at fault in a legally recognizable way."); id ("[Jiudges rather
than legislatures usually define what counts as a tort and how compensation is to be
measured.").
44. See Cavico, supra note 24, at 362--63 ("The primary remedial objective in tort, of
course, is to restore the victim to the position held before the tort, usually by replacing or
correcting the loss through compensation.").
45. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (discussing the compensatory
objectives present in contract law).

46. See

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 908(1) (1979) ("Punitive damages are
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law, unlike contract law,4 serves not only to compensate an injured party but
also to prevent torts from being committed by punishing the wrongdoer.4
B. Why Punitive Damages Are Awarded in Tort and Not in Contract:
Intent as the Deciding Factor
As a result of the separation of tort and contract doctrine, punitive
damages, traditionally, are associated only with tort law. 49 Because courts
create the duties in tort law, courts define what is wrongful and, in doing so,
have required an inquiry into an alleged wrongdoer's state of mind. 50 In other
damages, other than compensatory or nominal damages, awarded against a person to punish him
for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.").

47.

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

§ 355 (1981) ("Punitive damages are not

recoverable for a breach of contract unless the conduct constituting the breach is also a tort for
which punitive damages are recoverable."); PERILLO, supra note 40, § 14.3 ("Although such
awards are increasingly important in tort litigation, punitive damages are usually not awarded in
contract actions, no matter how egregious the breach."). More recently, some jurisdictions are
allowing punitive damages for a breach of contract in certain scenarios. See id. ("[S]ome
jurisdictions have gone beyond the independent tort and fiduciary violation cases and permit an
award of punitive damages where elements of fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression
'm-ingle' with the breach."). The point, however, is that punitive damages traditionally were
available only in tort law. The introduction and impact of punitive damages in contract law is
more thoroughly discussed in Part II.C, infra.
48. See, e.g., Dependahl v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 653 F.2d 1208, 1217 (8th Cir. 1981)
("So long as the party subject to the breach is compensated to the extent of his loss, there is no
reason to penalize the breaching party for refusing to perform his contractual obligations. The
breach frees the latter's resources to be used in a more efficient manner elsewhere."). This
statement represents the common law approach to breach of contract known as efficient breach
theory-"if a party breaches, and is still better off after paying damages to compensate the
victim of the breach. ...
the parties are better off because of the breach and the breach makes no
party worse off." PERILLO, supra note 40, § 14.36. This theory has been criticized as an
academic theory incompatible with real world scenarios, see id. ("The efficient breach theory
contains a number of simplify'ing assumptions that do not hold in the real world."), but the
important point is that common law contract theory seeks not as much to deter breach than it
does to compensate the victims of a breach. See Dependahl, 653 F.2d at 1217 ("The common
law of contract refuises to allow an award of punitive damages.").
49. See supra Part IL.A (discussing the traditional distinctions between tort and contract
law).
50. Cf., e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 (1979) (requiring an intent to cause a
harmful or offensive contact with another person in order to find that a battery occurred); id.
§ 21(1)(a) (requiring an intent to cause a harmful contact with another or intent to cause
apprehension of a harmfuil contact in order to find assault); id. § 500 (defining reckless
disregard to safety as failing to act on facts known or facts that the person should have known);
id. § 282 (defining negligence as failing to behave in the manner of a reasonable person,
suggesting that the state of mind of the reasonable person-what that person would have
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words, because most torts require that the defendant either intend the act or be
reckless or negligent in causing the injury,51 tort law requires the court to
determine whether the alleged tortfeasor had the requisite state of mind to have
committed the tort.
Tort law, therefore, lends itself well to a determination of whether punitive
damages should be awarded. The purpose of punitive damages is to punish
tortfeasors and to deter future wrongful behavior. 5 2 To accomplish this
purpose, courts return to the actor's state of mind: Punish "[w]here the
defendant's wrongdoing has been intentional and deliberate, and has the
character of outrage frequently associated with a crime."5 3 When evaluating
whether to award punitive damages in the tort context, a finding already has
been made regarding the defendant's state of mind. The factfinder need only
return to that state of mind determination to see if it is aggravated enough to
justify punitive damages.
Contract law, however, does not account for state of mind in the same
manner as tort law because contract law does not focus on the contracting
parties' subjective intent.5
In order to find that punitive damages are
appropriate, contract law would require a new and separate inquiry into the
breaching party's state of mind.5 Conventional views of contract law pay very
little attention to the parties' state of mind, so findings based on state of mind
seem contrived and out of place in contract theory.

thought was appropriate-controls the standard).
51. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (listing several torts and the state of mind
requirements necessary to find the torts).
52. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (discussing the definition and
objectives of punitive damages).
53. W. PAGE KEETON, ED., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2 (5th ed.
1984).
54. See PERILLO, supra note 40, § 2.4 ("The parties to a contract need not manifest an
intent to be bound or think about any legal consequences that might flow from their
agreement."). Parties to a contract must to some extent intend their actions that create a
contractual relationship. See id. § 2.2 ("[T]he acts manifesting assent must be done either
intentionally or negligently."). The inquiry, however, is more focused on the factual scenario
created by the parties' actions and not on the intent to form a contractual relationship. See id
("A party's intention will be held to be what a reasonable person in the position of the other
party would conclude the manifestation to mean.").

55.

See RicHARD

A. LORD,

23

WILLISTON ON CONTRAcTs

§ 63:1 (4th ed. 2002) (stating

that a breach of contract "is a failure, without legal excuse, to perform any promise that forms
the whole or part of a contract," but does not require intent to not perform in order to find a
breach).

704

7467 WASH. &LEE L. REV 693 (2010)

C. Modern Trends: Difficulty of IncorporatingState of MindAnalysis in
Contract Law
Despite the conventional separation of tort and contract doctrines, some
believe that the doctrines overlap or that the distinction between the two is
strictly formalistic and not practically useful .5 This is because tort duties
generally apply in all circumstances so that when parties enter into a contract,
not only have they created contractual duties to each other via their own
promises, but they also must observe the tort duties created by the courts.5 For
example, a party to a contract might have intentionally misrepresented facts in
order to obtain assent. If a court rules that the party's actions amount to fraud,
the court can apply contract law and declare the contract void, discharging any
duties the affected party owed to the party committing the misrepresentation. 8
Monetary damages for fraudulent misrepresentation are not available under
contract law. 59 In order to recover monetary damages, the victimized party also
must bring an action under tort law for fraudulent misrepresentation .60 A
person commits fraudulent misrepresentation under tort law when that person
misrepresents a fact for the purpose of inducing another to act or refrain from

56. See DOBBS, supra note 35, § 3 ("The fields of tort and contract do in fact overlap and
share many of the same premises."); KEETON, supra note 53, § 92 ("The distinction between tort
and contract liability, as between parties to a contract, has become an increasingly difficult
distinction to.mak.... .The availability of both kinds of liability for precisely the same kind of
harm has brought about confuision and unnecessary complexity."); see also DOBBS, supra note
35, § 3 ("A more radical view is that the distinction between tort and contract is entirely
manipulative .... In this view, the distinction between tort and contract does not represent any
underlying legal reality; it is merely instead a distinction invoked to facilitate the court's
analysis and conclusions.").
57. See KEETON, supra note 53, § 92 (stating that obligations created in tort law "are often
owed to all those within the range of harm or at least to some considerable class of people that
can include parties to a contract").
58. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 162(1) (1981) (finding a fraudulent
misrepresentation when the party making the statement intends his statement to induce the other
party to manifest consent and knows that the statement made was false or without basis in fact);
id § 164(l) ("If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent or material
misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the contract
is voidable by the recipient.").
59. See id. ch. 7 intro. (noting that misrepresentation has three distinct effects in contract
law: (1) prevents the formation of a contract; (2) makes a contract voidable; and (3) mandates a
decree to reform the contract); id. ("A misrepresentation may also be the basis for an affirmative
claim for liability for misrepresentation under the law of torts.").
60. See id ("[Blecause tort law imposes liability in damages for misrepresentation, while
contract law does not, the requirements imposed by contract law are in some instances less
stringent.").
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acting in reliance upon it. 61 If the court finds this form of fraudulent
misrepresentation, the victim is entitled to receive a monetary award to
62
compensate for pecuniary damages caused by the misrepresentation.
In sum, while one fraudulent act could create a situation in which the
victimized party can both void the contract and receive compensation for the
resulting injuries, the victimized party would need to institute both a tort- and a
contract-based cause of action in order to get both remedies.6 Some scholars
believe that this distinction requiring two different types of actions for one set
of circumstances is formalistic, trite, and unnecessary. 64 The distinction,
however, illustrates the incapacity of contract law to incorporate state of mind
analysis. Scholars who suggest that the formalities between contract and tort
law should be dropped also recognize that their approach will have to take into
account the major difference between the two doctrines--contract law's focus
on enforcing promises and tort law's focus on enforcing court-imposed duties

that monitor

conduct.65

For example, when determining the types of damages

to award for a breach of contract, it has been suggested that the court should
establish a clear standard for awarding punitive damages, like tort law does,
This standard would
separate from traditional contract law remedies.6
resemble a tort-like inquiry, focusing on the state of mind of the breaching
party to determine whether that party's behavior should be punished.6
The bottom line is that, to punish conduct in the contract context, it is
necessary to import tort law principles to determine the breaching party's state

61.
62.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

64.

See Cavico, supra note

525 (1979).

See id § 549(1) (stating that the victim of fraudulent misrepresentation receives both
the difference in value between what was received and the purchase price and an amount for the
pecuniary loss suffered as a consequence of relying on the misrepresentation).
63. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing the remedies available for
misrepresentation in contract and tort law).

24, at 390-91 (noting that a lawyer attempting to recover

monetary damages for a tort arising out of a contract scenario must be clear in distinguishing
tort theory from contract theory or else run the risk of the court dismissing the case, denying
recovery, or refuising to award damages).
65. See id. at 398 (stating that a breach becomes tortious when the conduct constituting
the breach violates the superimposed duty of good faith conduct and does not deal primarily
with a contractual promise).
66. See, e.g., id. at 445 ("The solution, therefore, requires providing a remedy for a
recognizable wrong, and assuring that a breacher is required to pay the higher measure of
damages only when the breacher's misconduct justifies the heightened liability.").
67. See id. (requiring an outrageous breach before awarding punitive damages for a
breach of contract, defining outrageous breach as "an intentional breach where the defendant
maliciously or oppressively caused harm to the plaintiff').
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of mind.6 The result of such an importation, even if viewed as equitable by the
courts, is to take contract law outside its traditional bounds. This leads to
unpredictable results and unclear standards.6
Iff. Introducing Uncertainty: § 523(a)(6)'s Wil ul and
Malicious Requirement
A. Introduction
Despite the confusion that results from introducing a tort state of mind
inquiry into contract law, Congress drafted such an element into the Bankruptcy
Code in an effort to restrict the benefits of bankruptcy to the honest,
unfortunate debtor.7 Under 11 U. S.C. § 523(a)(6), a debtor who willfully and
maliciously injures a person's property cannot discharge the resulting debt.7
The tort element in the provision is "willful and malicious." In order to be
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6), the debtor's state of mind must
deserve punishment, a concept carried over from tort law.7 The provision that
implicates contract law is "injury to property." In sum, note the two separate
elements under § 523(a)(6) regarding property: (1) an injury to property, such
as a breach of contract (contract inquiry), (2) done willfully and maliciously
(tort inquiry).
Often, the injury to property that a creditor wishes to except from
discharge is an injury arising from a breach of contract-the debtor refuses to
comply with the terms of a contract and does not return the creditor's monetary
investment, knowing that the failure to repay will financially injure the

68. See id. ("[T]he standard must distinguish between misconduct which merely entails
the breach of the contract duty, rendering traditional contract remedies applicable, and
outrageous misconduct accompanying the breach which contravenes punitive damage standards,
rendering punitive damages applicable."); see also supranotes 65-67 and accompanying text
(discussing the transfer of a state of mind inquiry in tort law into the contract context to punish
certain breaches of contract).
69. See Cavico, supranote 24, at 433 ("The imposition of potentially large liability in the
absence of precise standards, although obviously fulfilling a compensatory fuinction, may
produce great uncertainty for all contracting parties.").
70. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing the purposes of bankruptcy
law as attempting to allow the honest but unfortunate debtor a chance to discharge debts that he
cannot pay).

71.

11 U.S.C. §523(a)(6) (2006).

72. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (describing different torts and the requisite
state of mind necessary to find the existence of each tort).
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creditor.7 Refusal to discharge would frustrate the purpose of a fresh start to
the debtor by forcing the debtor to pay debts resulting from an inability to
pay.7 Courts, therefore, require more than just a breach 7 5-they require a

heightened state of mental culpability. 76 Congress defined that heightened state
of mind as "willful and maiiu.0 The trouble is that no clear definition of a
willful and malicious breach of contract exists.7 Courts have been left with the
task of defining a willful and malicious breach of contract .79 As noted in Part II
of this Note, such a hybrid inquiry into the state of mind of a party breaching a
contract has never proven to be simple or to have predictable results.8
This Part of the Note traces the courts' attempts to define a willful and
malicious breach of contract by (1) examining the courts' definitions of willful
and malicious before the Supreme Court's decision in Geiger, (2) analyzing the
Supreme Court's seminal decision on the topic in Geiger, and (3) critiquing the
various lines of interpretation post-Geiger.
B. Pre-GeigerAnalysis of "Willful and Malicious"
The first attempt to clearly define "willful and malicious injury" came in
the form of a 1904 decision by the United States Supreme Court-Tinker v.

73. See In re Hambley, 329 B.R. 382, 392-93 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding a willful
and malicious injury to property when the debtors falsely induced the creditor to invest and then
failed to return the investment in compliance with the terms in the contract, knowing such
actions would injure the creditor); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing in
full the specific situation of the debtors in liambley and the different provisions of the Code in
which the debts created were excepted from discharge).
74. Cf Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (stating that by discharging
debts, bankruptcy gives to the honest but unfortunate debtor an opportunity for a fresh start).
75. See, e.g., In re Guillory, 285 B.R. 307, 313 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002) ("Generally,
debts arising from intentional breaches of contract are not excepted from discharge under
§ 523(a)(6).").
76. See I11U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (requiring that injury caused to person or property be
willful and malicious).
7 7. Id.
78. See Jeff Weinberg, Comment, Accidental 'Willfull and Malicious Injury': The
Intoxicated Driver and Section 523(a)(6) , 1 BANKR. DEv. J. 135, 140-41 (1984) (commenting
that the legislative history behind the enactment of § 523(a)(6) only increased the confusion of
how to interpret the language of the provision).
79. Deborah A. Ballam, The "Willful and Malicious" Injury Exception to Discharge in
Bankruptcy: An Analysis and Recommended Revision, 28 Amv.Bus. L.J. 87, 89 (1990)
("Congress, however, has not provided a definition of 'willful and malicious."').
80. See supra Part II.C (discussing the difficulties of tailoring a state of mind inquiry to a
breach of contract situation, focusing specifically on punitive damages for breach of contract).
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Colwefl-which interpreted the "willful and malicious injury" language under
the 1894 Bankruptcy Act.8 In Tinker, a creditor wished to except from
discharge a $50,000 judgment obtained against the debtor for criminal
conversation by classifying the debt as a willful and malicious injury."3 The
Court decided that the injury to the creditor was willful and malicious even
though the creditor did not prove that the debtor intended to injure or that the
debtor caused the injury with a malicious intent.84 The Court stated that, in
order for an act to be willful and malicious, no specific intent to cause injury or
malignant spirit is required 85 as long as willfulness and malice can be implied
from the circumstances surrounding the injury.8 All that is required is (1) an
81. See Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473,490 (1904) (affirming the order of the Court of
Appeals of New York that a debt under criminal conversation with creditor's wife was willful
and malicious under § 17(a)(2) of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act). In this case, the issue was whether
a judgment for $50,000 for criminal conversation (a phrase used to denote the crime of adultery)
was excepted from discharge as a willful and malicious injury. Id. at 480. Specifically, the
debtor incurred a $50,000 judgment against him for partaking in "criminal conversation" with
the creditor's wife. Id at 48 1. The Court first found that criminal conversation was a trespass
on the marital rights of the husband. Id at 484. Finding such trespass, the Court then found
that such a trespass was willful and malicious injury to the husband. Id. at 485. In making that
finding, the Court articulated the meaning of "willful and malicious"-no specific intent to
injure or malice toward the creditor need be proven as long as the act causing the injury was
intended and that after looking at the circumstances it can be concluded that the act was of a
malicious nature. Id at 48 8-89. Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the Court found
that the criminal conversation with the creditor's wife was willful and malicious, even though
no specific intent to injure or harm the creditor was proven, because the Court concluded that
act, looking at the circumstances, was one of the most harmful things a man could do to another
man's marriage. Id. at 489-90.
82. See Ballam, supra note 79, at 90 (stating that the issue in Tinker was "whether the
judgment for criminal conversation was a 'willful and malicious injury' within the meaning of
[]1 7(a)(2), thereby precluding the debtor's discharge in bankruptcy").
83. See Tinker, 193 U.S. at 474 (describing the details behind the injury to the creditor
that caused him to move for an exception to discharge).
84. See id. at 485 ("We think that such an act is also a willful and malicious injury to the
person or property of the husband, within the meaning of the exception in the statute."); id at
487 ("[A] malignant spirit or a specific intention to hurt a particular person is not an essential
element.").
85. See id at 489 (stating that specific intent to injure or malice towards the individual
injured is not required). The Court specifically stated:
It might be conceded that the language of the exception could be so construed as to
make the exception refer only to those injuries to person or property which were
accompanied by particular malice, or, in other words, a malevolent purpose towards
the injured person, and where the action could only be maintained upon proof of
the existence of such malice. But we do not think the fair meaning of the statute
would thereby be carried out.
Id
86. See id at 487 ("'[If he acted wantonly against what any man of reasonable

FILLING IN THE BLANK79

709

intent to do only the act itself, and (2) a result that causes the court to conclude
87
that the act was wrongful.
Initially, courts interpreted the Tinker standard to include reckless acts in
which the actor intended the act but not its result, and the result was caused
wantonly.8 8 For example, courts denied discharge to a debt resulting from the
debtor's wanton operation of a motor vehicle that caused personal injury.8 9 The
court specifically stated that "wanton and reckless conduct is conclusive
evidence of every element of 'willful and malicious' conduct as defined by the
Supreme Court in Tinker v. Colwell.""0 Under Tinker, no specific intent, intent
to injure, or malice need be shown.9'
Such a loose interpretation of willful and malicious, however, did not rest
well with Congress. After enacting § 523(a)(6) in the 1978 Bankruptcy Code,
Congress included in the Code's legislative history a comment that overruled
Tinker to the extent that Tinker excepted from discharge debts arising from
reckless behavior.9
Congress mandated that "willful" be interpreted as
intelligence must have known to be contrary to his duty, and purposely prejudicial and injurious
to another, the law will imply malice. "' (quoting In re Freche, 109 F. 620, 621 (D.N.J. 190 1))).
87. See id. at 485 (noting that intent is necessary to the extent that it is intention to do the
act itself). On this topic, the Court stated that in terms of a willful and malicious act:
[T~he act itself necessarily implies that degree of malice which is sufficient to bring
the case within the exception stated in the statute. The act is willful, of course, in
the sense that it is intentional and voluntary, and we think that it is also malicious
within the meaning of the statute.
Id.
88. See Ballam, supra note 79, at 90 ("Subsequent to Tinker, some courts interpreted that
case as prohibiting the discharge under § 17(a)(2) of debts based on merely reckless conduct.").
89. See Den Haerynck v. Thompson, 228 F.2d 72, 75 (10th Cir. 1955) (finding as a
willful and malicious injury a reckless driving accident that resulted in the death of the
creditor's son and also resulted in a manslaughter charge against the defendant); Harrison v.
Donnelly, 153 F.2d 588,591 (8th Cir. 1946) (excepting from discharge as willful and malicious
conduct a debt incurred through the debtor's willful and wanton operation of a truck).
90. Harrison, 153 F.2d at 591; see also Den Haerynck, 228 F.2d at 74 ("A willful
disregard of that which one knows to be his duty, or an act which is wrongful in and of itself,
and which necessarily causes injury, if done intentionally, is done willfully and maliciously,
within the scope of the exception to dischargeability created by the statute.").
91. See supra note 81 and accompanying text (describing the United States Supreme
Court decision in Tinker that interpreted willful and malicious to require only reckless conduct
and not specific intent to injure).
92. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 365 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963,
6320-21 ("Under this paragraph, 'willful' means deliberate or intentional. To the extent that
Tinkerv. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1902), held that a looser standard is intended, and to the extent
that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a 'reckless disregard' standard, they are
overruled."); see also Ballam, supra note 79, at 90 ("[Tlhe legislative history for [§] 523(a)(6)
indicates that Congress was overruling post-Tinker judicial interpretations that a looser standard
requiring less than actual intent was intended, or that reckless disregard could satisfy the
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deliberate or intentional.9 Debts arising from acts caused by reckless behavior
no longer were excepted from discharge.9
Congress, however, did not entirely clear up the § 523(a)(6) interpretation
problem. While Congress mandated that "willful" means intentional, courts
differed in their interpretation of intentional-some interpreted it to mean
acting with the intent to inflict an injury while others interpreted it to mean
intending to do an act that necessarily causes injury.9 5 The Court in Geiger
eventually attempted to clarify the meaning of willful and defined it to require
an intent to injure.

96

Still, the analysis of the courts that required an intent to injure before
Geiger mandated such an interpretation is of interest. While all these courts
arrived at the same solution, the analysis the courts used varied.9 One line of
cases interpreted willful and malicious by splitting the terms apart and giving
each a specific meaning to arrive at requiring an intention to injure-willful
meaning intentional act and malicious meaning harmful or wrongful.9 The
other line of cases, however, focused on the word willful, finding that willful
required an intent to injure. 99 Even when courts interpreted willful and
malicious to obtain the same result as the Supreme Court in Geiger, those

willfulness standard within the meaning of that section. Rather, said Congress, 'willful' means
deliberate or intentional.").
93. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 365 ("'[Wiillful' means deliberate or intentional."); see
also supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history behind § 523(a)(6),
specifically stating that willful and malicious injury is not supposed to include reckless acts).
94. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history to
§ 523(a)(6) that specifically states that intent is required in order for an act to be willful and
malicious).
95. See Ballain, supra note 79, at 90 ("The interpretative problem that remained, however,
was whether in the legislative history clarifying [§] 523(a)(6) the term 'willfuil' required an
actual intent to inflict an injury (a narrow standard), or merely required intent to do an act that
necessarily results in injury (a broad standard).").
96. See infra Part III.C (discussing the Geiger Court's interpretation of willful and
malicious as requiring an intent to injure).
97. Compare In re Hodges, 4 B.R. 513, 516 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980) (interpreting willful
to mean an intentional act and interpreting the term malicious as the piece that makes willful and
malicious require an intentional injury), with In re Cecchini, 37 BR. 671, 674 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1984) (interpreting willful and malicious as requiring an intentional injury after interpreting
willful as requiring an intentional injury).
98. See Hodges, 4 B.R. at 516 ("While a wilful act is not a malicious act unless the intent
is to do harm or to act in utter disregard of another's rights, it is not necessary that one be
incited by a malevolent or malicious motive. .. .)
99. See Cecchini, 37 B.R. at 674 ("If we substitute 'intentional' for 'willful' in the statute,
we get 'intentional and malicious injury,' or simply 'intentional injury."').
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courts still disagreed on the meanings assigned to each term and how the two
terms combined so that willful and malicious required an intent to harm."10
C. Kawaauhau v. Geiger: Attempt at Clarifing the Meaning of Willful
and Malicious
In 1998, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Kawaauhauv. Geiger in order to address the issue of whether the "willful and
malicious injury" exception to discharge under § 523(a)(6) covered only those
acts with an intent to injure or covered all intentional acts in which injury
necessarily followed.1 0 ' In the case, creditor Margaret Kawaauhau sought
treatment from Dr. Geiger for a foot injury.'102 In order to treat the leg for
infection, Dr. Geiger prescribed a less effective form of penicillin based on
what he thought Kawaauhau could afford. 103 Dr. Geiger also left town
immediately after prescribing the penicillin and, upon return, canceled
Kawaauhau's scheduled treatments in the belief that the injury had subsided.'04
As a result, "Kawaauhau's condition deteriorated over the next few days,
requiring the amputation of her right leg below the knee." 10 5 Kawaauhau filed
suit against Dr. Geiger for malpractice and won an approximately $355,000
judgment from the jury.106 Dr. Geiger eventually filed for bankruptcy and
Kawaauhau, under § 523(a)(6), sought to except from discharge the judgment
obtained from the malpractice claim as a willful and malicious injury.10
The Court focused on the state of mind required to be found guilty of
malpractice. Malpractice is not necessarily an intentional tort-while an actor
can commit malpractice by intending the act that causes injury to the patient,

the actor need not intend the injury in order to establish a malpractice

Suit. 108

The Court stated that "'willful' in (a)(6) modifies the word 'injury,' indicating
100. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing the two lines of cases that
vary in their analysis in finding that willful and malicious requires an intention to injure).
101. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 60 (1998) (stating that certiorari was granted
in order to clear up conflicting interpretations between circuits as to whether what is excepted
under § 523(a)(6) is confined to debts based on an intentional tort).
102. Id. at 59.
103. Id
104. Id
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Idat60.
108. See id at 61-62 ("Intentional torts generally require that the actor intend the
consequences of an act, not simply the act itself." (citations and emphasis omitted)).
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that nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a
deliberate or intentional act that leads to injury."109 If every injury of that type
was excepted from discharge, an overly broad range of injuries, including
reckless and negligent injuries, could be seen as "willfuil and malicious."" 0 The
Court, in fact, even suggested that § 523(a)(6) should be limited to intentional
torts, 11 but that comnmentary was not accepted by every jurisdiction.' 12 The
Court concluded that because a "willful injury" under § 523(a)(6) required an
intent to injure and because Dr. Geiger did not intend the injury he caused to
Kawaauhau, Kawaauhau's injury was not a willful injury and the judgment was
3
not excepted from discharge."
The significance of the Geiger decision is that it gave a definition to the
term willful-willfuil modifies injury so that an injury excepted from discharge
under § 523(a)(6) must be an intentional injury." 4 This conclusion seems to
109. Id. at 61.
110. See id at 62 ("A construction so broad would be incompatible with the 'well-known'
guide that exceptions to discharge 'should be confined to those plainly expressed."' (quoting
Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915))).
111. See id. at 61-62 ("[T]he (a)(6) formulation triggers in the lawyer's mind the category
'intentional torts,' as distinguished from negligent or reckless torts. Intentional torts generally
require that the actor intend 'the consequences of an act,' not simply 'the act itself.'' (emphasis

omitted) (quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 8A cmt. a (1964))).

112. See, e.g., Hughes v. Arnold, 393 B.R. 712, 719 (E.D. Cal. 2008) ("Nondischargeable
debt under § 523(a)(6) is not limited to debt arising out of an intentional tort.").
113. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 64 (1998) (holding that debts arising from
reckless or negligent behavior do not fall within the scope of § 523(a)(6) and, therefore, that the
debts in this case did not fall within the exception).
114. It is important to note that even after Geiger the exact meaning of "willful," while
requiring an intent to injure, is not clear. See, e.g., In re Whiters, 337 B.R. 326, 340-41 (lBankr.
N.D. Ind. 2006) ("The next diversion in post-Geiger cases is whether the 'willful' standard
enunciated by Geiger is a totally subjective standard which relates solely to the internal
workings of the debtor's mind, or whether there are elements of objective evaluation which may
be weighted in the 'willful' standard."). Under the subjective approach, the debtor must have
intended the injury to the creditor or at least believed that the injury was substantially certain to
occur. Id. at 343; see also In re Markowitz, 190 F.3d 455, 464 (6th Cir. 1999) ("[U]nless the
actor desires to cause the consequences of his act, or .. . believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it, he has not conmmitted a willful and malicious injury as
defined under § 523(a)(6)." (quotations omitted)). Under the objective approach, the creditor
need not prove subjective intent as long as the injury was substantially certain to occur from the
act. See, e.g., Whiters, 337 B.R. at 341 ("[Sjome courts have developed a standard that the
'willful' element may be established by either proof that there was an 'objective substantial
certainty of harm,' or a subjective motive to do harm."); Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re
Miller), 156 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[Elither objective substantial certainty or
subjective motive meets the Supreme Court's definition of 'willful ... injury' under
§ 523(a)(6)."). The subjective approach appears to be the more reasonable approach because
allowing for debts to be "willful" just because the act was substantially certain to cause injury,
without any analysis of the intentions of the debtor, seems to go against the main principle of
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comply with Congress's intent to exclude from § 523(a)(6) those debts arising
from recklessly and negligently committed harms,"' but in its analysis the

Court focused its attention on defining willful."16 The questions remaining after
Geiger center around the term malicious." 7 Specifically, if "willful" requires
that the debtor intended to injure the creditor, then what more is added by
8
requiring that such injury also be malicious?'"
D. Interpretationsof "Wi4lful and Malicious Injury" in a Breach
of ContractScenario After Geiger: Overbroad
Interpretationof "Malicious"
An interpretation of terms in a statute should not render any term
meaningless." 9 Therefore, "malicious" needs some interpretation that adds to
the definition of "willful." "Willfuil" after Geiger, however, requires an intent
to injure-that is, both an intentional act and an intentional injury.120 The
Geiger-anintentional injury is required. See Whiters, 337 B.R. at 343 ("After Geiger, there is
no room for the 'objective' inquiry into the probabilities of harm, because to do so renders the
'willfual' element of § 523(a)(6) tantamount to the mere intention to act without intending the
consequences of the act in relation to the injury.").
115. See Ballam, svupra note 79, at 98 ("[Tjhe plain meaning of'wil1lfl... injury' is that
the injury itself must be intentional; an intentional act causing injury simply does not fit within
the plain meaning of the statute's words.").
116. See, e.g., Whiters, 337 B.R. at 335 ("Thus far, then, Geiger clearly teaches that in
order to fall within 11I U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), an alleged act by the debtor must have been
'willful' . .. and must have been directed to causing the injury ..
There is no hint in the
decision that the tern 'malicious' was ever considered as part of the willful standard.. ..
(emphasis omitted)); In re Moffitt, 254 B.R. 389, 394-95 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2000) ("The
Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Kawaauhauv. Geiger... , recently held that
in order for an act to be considered willful under § 523(a)(6), a debtor must not only intend the
act itself, but must also intend the consequences of the act." (citations omitted)); In re Rogers,
239 B.R. 318, 321 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1999) ("The United States Supreme Court observed in
Geiger that '[tihe word "willful" in (a)(6) modifies the word "injury," indicating that
nondischargeability takes a deliberate or intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional
act that leads to injury."' (quoting Geiger, 523 U.S. at 61)).
117. See, e.g., Kleinberg, supra note 19, at 87 ("Since the Supreme Court's ruling in
Geiger, courts have split over whether willful and malicious injury is established solely by
proving intentional injury, or whether 'willful' requires a finding of intentional injury and
'malicious' requires that the act be without just cause or excuse.").
118. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (discussing the current circuit split
over the issue of how to interpret "willful and malicious" after Geiger).
119. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 837 (1988)
("[W]e are hesitant to adopt an interpretation of a congressional enactment which renders
superfluous another portion of that same law.").
120. See supra note 114 and accompanying text (discussing interpretation of willful in
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Court in Geiger defined willful to include wrongful behavior.'12 ' Malicious,
however, traditionally incorporates the element of wrongdoing,12 2 so confusion
surrounds the new role of the term malicious-how much more wrongdoing
does malicious require in order for an injury to be excepted under § 523(a)(6)?
When dealing with injuries to a person, similar to Geiger, this confusion is
not so great. Geiger set the precedent for determining the sort of conduct
required in order for an injury to a person to qualify as a willful and malicious
injury. The Court addressed the problem that Congress attempted to solve
when drafting the Bankruptcy Code and included only those injuries that were
caused with an intent to injure. This is not a new inquiry-tort law often
requires the factfinder to look at the tortfeasor' s state of mind and determine
whether that tortfeasor intended to injure the victim.
The mixing of the terms willful and malicious causes the greatest
confusion when trying to discern whether an injury to property arising from a
breach of contract is willful and malicious. A knowing breach of contract
alone never is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6). 21 1 Wrongful conduct
accompanying a breach of contract, however, can amount to a willful and
malicious injury, even if such conduct in the absence of a contract would not
constitute a separate tort.'12 4 The question is, how do courts decide what
conduct accompanying a breach of contract is enough to constitute a willfuil and
malicious injury under § 523(a)(6)?
There are many different interpretations as to what is required for conduct
accompanying a breach of contract to cause a debt to be excepted from
discharge under § 523(a)(6). These interpretations turn on post-Geiger
interpretations of what Geiger meant by defining willful as requiring an
intentional injury.'12 5 While Geiger says willful means an intentional injury to
Geiger).
121. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text (describing interpretation in Geiger of
willful as requiring more than a deliberate act but also an intent to injure).
122. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text (explaining that "malicious" under
§ 523(a)(6) is the term that requires debts excepted from discharge under this section to be
wrongful).
123. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57,62 (1998) ("A 'knowing breach of contract'
could also qualify'. A construction so broad would be incompatible with the 'well-known' guide
that exceptions to discharge 'should be confined to those plainly expressed."' (quoting Gleason
v. Thlaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915))).
124. See, e.g., In re Riso, 978 F.2d 1151, 1154 (9th Cur. 1992) ("An intentional breach of
contract is excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) only when it is accompanied by malicious
and willful tortious conduct.").
125. CompareHughes v. Arnold, 393 B.R. 712, 719 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (citing In reJercich
for direct support of the proposition that "intentional injury" language from Geiger did not
require that an intentional tort be present for an injury to be excepted under § 523(a)(6)), with
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the creditor, courts have split on what an intentional injury actually requiresdoes it require that the conduct surrounding the breach of contract constitute an
intentional tort as defined by state law,'12 6 or that the conduct need not constitute
an independent tort, but that the debtor intended the injury or believe that the
injury was substantially certain to occur?127 The meaning of the term malicious
changes and the debts excepted as "willful and malicious" differ depending on
how a jurisdiction defines Geiger's "intentional injury" requirement under
willful.
In order to see how "willful and malicious" is interpreted post-Geiger,the
rest of this Part explores: (1) the meaning of "malicious" in jurisdictions
reading willful to require that an intentional tort accompany the breach of
contract; (2) the meaning of "malicious" in jurisdictions reading willful to
require no more than an intent to injure or belief that injury was substantially
certain to occur; and (3) the problems and confusion that result from the lack of
a clear understanding as to exactly what "malicious" requires.
1. Interpretationof Malicious in JurisdictionsRequiring
Conduct Accompanying a Breach of Contractto
Constitute an Intentional Tort
Jurisdictions requiring an intentional tort to accompany a breach of
contract point to the language of Geiger forjustification: "[T]he [§ 523] (a)(6)
formulation triggers in the lawyer's mind the category 'intentional torts,' as

distinguished from negligent or reckless

torts."'128

Under this view, conduct

accompanying a breach of contract must constitute an intentional tort in order
to provide courts with a clear rule as to what wrongful conduct is eligible for
exception. This is to prevent courts from twisting the words "intent to injure"
Lockerby v. Sierra, 535 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2008) (citingIn reJercichfor direct support
of the proposition that § 523(a)(6) requires an intentional tort as defined by state law).
126. See, e.g., Lockerby, 535 F.3d at 1042 (requiring an intentional tort). The court
specifically stated:
That the Supreme Court in Geiger assumed that § 523(a)(6) encompassed only
intentional torts, not intentional breaches of contract, strongly suggests the Court
would not approve of a definition of "tortious conduct" that would include
intentional breaches of contract whenever it is substantially certain that the breach
will cause injury.
Id
127. See, e.g., In re Williams, 337 F.3d 504,510 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[A] knowing breach ofa
clear contractual obligation that is certain to cause injury may prevent discharge under
[1523(a)(6), regardless of the existence of separate tortious conduct.").
128. Geiger, 523 U.S. at 62.
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to include a knowing breach of contract and to keep the courts' focus on
29
wrongful acts.'1

Once courts find an intentional tort accompanying the breach of contract,
the next question relates to the interpretation of malicious-whether the
intentional tort was wrongful enough to be excepted from discharge. Courts
after Geiger have not agreed on how to interpret malicious so that the term adds
meaning to "willful and malicious injury." Specifically, one line of decisions
requires "specific malice"-specific, subjective intent to injure the creditor' 0 while a second line of cases requires only "implied malice"--objective and
13
circumstantial inquiry finding wrongful conduct. '
If a jurisdiction requires an intentional tort and specific malice, to give
both terms meaning, the court may break down "willful and malicious" by
defining the terms as follows: "willful"-an intentional tort accompanying the
breach; "malicious"-that the intentional tort was committed with the specific
intent to harm the creditor. 13 2 This breakdown provides a clear interpretation
for courts to follow because, to find an intentional tort, the factfinder must
inquire into the state of mind of the alleged tortfeasor. 31 3 To find a willful and
malicious injury, the factfinder need only reexamine the state of mind of the
tortfeasor and determine whether the actor behaved in a fashion aggravated
enough to warrant exception to discharge-whether the actor intended the harm
to the creditor. Indeed, such an inquiry should seem familiar-it is exactly
what the factfinder does when determining whether to award punitive
34

damages.1

The practical result of requiring courts to make such strict findings of
subjective intent, however, is to render § 523(a)(6) inapplicable to injuries

129. See Lockerby, 535 F.3d at 1042 ("Expanding the scope of § 523(a)(6) to include
contracts that are intentionally breached whenever it is substantially certain that injury will
occur would severely circumscribe the ability of debtors to 'start afresh."').
130. See, e.g., In re Bren, 284 B.R. 681, 699 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2002) ("The word
'malicious' in 11IU.S.C. § 523(a)(6) is defined as conduct targeted at the creditor at least in the
sense that the conduct is certain or almost certain to cause harm.").
131. See, e.g., In re Hambley, 329 B.R. 382,402 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("A malicious
injury is a wrongful injury, caused without just cause or excuse but does not require 'personal
hatred, spite, or ill will."').
132. Cf e.g., Bren, 284 B.R. at 699 (finding no willful and malicious injury under
§ 523(a)(6) because there was no intentional tort accompanying the breach of contract and the
debtor did not intend the harm caused to the creditor).
133. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (listing several intentional torts and their
respective state of mind elements).
134. See supra Part II.B (describing the subjective elements involved in tort law and
explaining why such elements make tort law compatible with findings for punitive damages).
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resulting from a breach of contract.13 5 A party that breaches a contract rarely, if
ever, does so intending to harm the creditor, even if the conduct constituting the
breach also constitutes an intentional tort. The breaching party usually fails to
meet a contract's payment plan136 or interferes with a security agreement
because the breaching party is forced to do so by a troubled financial
situation. 137 If courts required that an intent to harm the creditor accompany a
breach, injury to property resulting from a breach of contract would rarely fall
within the scope of a willful and malicious injury.
A majority of the courts recognize the impracticality of such a reading and
38
do not require that the debtor subjectively intend to harm the creditor.1
Instead, in an implied malice jurisdiction, once an intentional tort is found, the
court looks at the circumstances surrounding the intentional tort and decides
whether such conduct is wrongful enough to be within the scope of
§ 523(a)(6). 139 The language used to define malice by implied malice courts,
however, does not clearly define what malicious requires because the language
40
was the same language used to define "malicious" pre-Geiger.1
135. See St. Paul Fire & Marine & Ins. Co. v. Vaughn, 779 F.2d 1003, 1009 (4th Cir.
1985) ("To require specific malice or some other strict standard of malice for nondischargeability of a debt under the Bankruptcy Code would undermine the purposes of that
provision and place a 'nearly impossible burden' on a creditor who wishes to show that a debtor
intended to do him harm." (quoting United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 B.R. 766, 772
(N.D. 1ll. 1983))).
136. See, e.g., In re Whiters, 337 B.R. 326, 353 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2006) (describing
debtor's situation as one in which debtor had serious financial difficulties and in order to make
loan payments signed over, in contradiction of security agreement, collateral securing debtor's
loan).
137. See, e.g., In re Gagle, 230 B.R. 174, 176-78 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999) (finding as fact
that the debtor was in a difficult financial situation and had sold off parts of the collateral,
thereby altering the collateral in contradiction of security agreement).
138. See In re Jacobs, 381 B.R. 128, 137 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) ("In the overwhelming
majority of cases, courts have taken a broader view, holding that the 'willful and malicious'
nature of the injury caused by a debtor's conduct may be inferred from the nature of the act
itself.").
139. See id at 138 ("To be 'malicious,' the debtor's actions either must have been taken
with the specific goal of causing harm to the creditor or must have been substantially certain to
have caused harm.").
140. See, e.g., Jacobs, 381 B.R. at 137 (citing a pre-GeigerThird Circuit definition when
defining malicious) (citing In re Conte, 33 F.3d 303, 305 (3d Cir. 1994)); Whiters, 337 B.R. at
343-44 (citing a pre-Geiger Seventh Circuit Decision defining malicious as a "'conscious
disregard of one's duties without just cause or excuse"' (quoting Matter of Thirtyacre, 36 F.3d
697, 700 (7th Cir. 1994))); In re Scheller, 265 B.R. 39,54-55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing a
pre-Geiger Second Circuit definition when defining malicious as an injurious act done without
just cause or excuse) (citing In re Stelluti, 94 F.3d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1996)); Gagle, 230 B.R. at
180 (citing a pre-Geiger Tenth Circuit decision defining a malicious act as one done without
justification or excuse and declaring it binding on post-Geiger case) (citing In re Pasek, 983
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To demonstrate the ineffectiveness of pre-Geiger language defining
"1malicious," it is important to examine that language in context. Conversion is
an intentional tort that often accompanies a breach of contract.'14 1 Conversion
"is an intentional exercise of dominion or control of a chattel which so seriously
interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be
required to pay the other the full value of the chattel."142 In the breach of
contract scenario, conversion commonly occurs when a debtor retains
possession of collateral after defaulting on a security agreement and then
proceeds to make material changes to that collateral in contradiction to the
43
security agreement.1

Once conversion is found, courts in an implied malice jurisdiction look to
the definition of malicious to see whether the conversion was wrongful enough
to be excepted from discharge. The definition of malicious varies in each
implied malice jurisdiction, but common phrases are: (1) injury caused without
just cause or excuse; 44 (2) "conscious disregard of one's duties without just
cause or excse" 45 and (3) "aggravated conduct."146 As noted above, these
phrases are not adjusted to the Geiger interpretation of willful as requiring an
intentional inuy 4 and, therefore, do not add much guidance in deciding
which intentional torts are more wrongful and within the scope of § 523(a)(6).
Specifically, after a court finds conversion, thereby finding "willfulness,"
is such conduct accompanying a breach any more wrongful because it is
(1) "without just cause or excuse?" Unlike a situation in which the tortfeasor
F.2d 1524, 1527 (10th Cir. 1993)).
141. See, e.g., In re Bren, 284 B.R. 681, 699 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2002) (finding, in part, no
willful and malicious injury because the debtor's acts did not constitute conversion); Gagle, 230
BAR. at 185 (concluding that a debtor who converted creditor's security interest knowing that
such conversion would injure the debtor was willful and malicious under § 523(a)(6)).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222A(l) (1965).
143. See, e.g., In re Gagle, 230 B.R. 174, 181 (Bankr. D. Utah) (finding conversion when
debtor substantially interfered with creditor's security interest in a truck by selling off all of the
truck's value).
144. See, e.g., In re Hambley, 329 B.R. 382, 402 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("A malicious
injury is a wrongful injury, caused without just cause or excuse but does not require 'personal
hatred, spite, or ill will."' (quoting In re Scheller, 265 B.R. 39,54-55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001))).
145. See, e.g., Matter of Thirtyacre, 36 F.3d 697, 700 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Under
§ 523(a)(6). ...
malicious means in conscious disregard of one's duties or without just cause or
excuse

....

)

146. See, e.g., In reJacobs, 381 B.R. 128,139 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) ("The Long Court's
teaching, that conduct must be is [sic] 'more culpable' or involve 'aggravated circumstances' to
rise to the level of malice, is helpful.").
147. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (listing jurisdictions that use pre-Geiger
interpretations of "malicious" to analyze whether an injury is "willful and malicious" postGeiger).
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strikes a victim intentionally in the face without any explanation, 4 parties
breaching a contract and converting property usually have an excuse-hard
financial circumstances forced the party to breach the contract and convert
property in order to survive.149 The question not answered by this definition of
malicious is how the courts are supposed to differentiate between excuses when
a party breaches contract. Requiring an excuse is not much help in
distinguishing one conversion as more culpable than another.
Is a conversion resulting from a breach of contract more wrongful because
it is (2) "in conscious disregard of one's duties?" This language seems
completely out of place because it is borrowed from the definition of reckless
conduct. 5 0 Furthermore, tort law defines one's duties. When a debtor
breaches a contract and commits conversion, the debtor has disregarded a
duty.' 5 ' Nothing further is required by this definition other than the
commission of an intentional tort. This definition of malicious does not require
any heightened culpability and it is not of much assistance when trying to
determine what malicious requires.
Is a conversion resulting from a breach of contract more wrongful because
it (3) resulted from a heightened level of aggravated conduct? Conversion does
not require any intent to harm the creditor-it only requires an intention to
interfere with the creditor's ownership interests in property.152 "Aggravated
conduct" looks to the debtor's state of mind and requires a more culpable state
of mind than that required by conversion.15 3 This language, however, does not
seem to be any more useful because it does not clarify' what conduct qualifies as
''aggravated conduct.''
148. Cf In re Whiters, 337 B.R. 326, 344 n.6 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1999) (articulating the
difference between willfuil and malicious in a personal injury scenario involving an intentional
tort of battery and then saying that such an intent to harm someone physically is without just
cause or excuse). Note, however, that the footnote chooses a physical injury resulting from an
intentional tort to illustrate clearly the meaning of malicious, even though the facts of the case
involve a breach of contract. Id
149. See, e.g., In re Gagle, 230 B.R. 174, 177 (Bankr. D. Utah 1999) ("In the beginning he
sold only a few parts with the intent that when his financial condition improved, he would
replace the parts.").
150. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 500 (1965) ("An actor's conduct is ...
reckless .. . if he does an act intentionally. ...
knowing or having reason to know of facts which
would lead a reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of
physical harm to another .... 1)
151. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (explaining that tort law focuses on
addressing societal wrongs).
152. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (defining conversion).
153. See Whiters, 337 B.R. at 338 ("[A] willful and malicious injury does not follow as of
course from every act of conversion, without reference to the circumstances.").
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Therefore, in jurisdictions that use the language in (1) and (2), it seems as
though defining "willful" as requiring an intentional tort has completely
rendered the definitions of malicious without any meaning. In jurisdictions that
use the language in (3), it seems that the tort to be excepted under § 523(a)(6)
must be more culpable than a simple conversion of property. Requiring
"aggravated conduct," however, does not specify the sort of conduct
accompanying conversion that would make conversion surrounding a breach of
contract an aggravated action. Overall, it appears that courts, after finding an
intentional tort, are left to their own devices to decide what torts are
accompanied by wrongful conduct so as to fit the requirements of
§ 523(a)(6). 114 While this allows courts some flexibility to craft equitable
decisions that reflect the purposes of bankruptcy law,' the lack of a clear
56
standard creates a great deal of uncertainty.1
2. Interpretationsof Malicious in JurisdictionsRequiring an Intentional
In]jury or Belief that an Injury Is Substantially Certain to Occur
While some uncertainty exists in jurisdictions that require an intentional
tort in a breach of contract scenario, uncertainty reigns supreme when no
intentional tort is required. In these jurisdictions, "willful" requires only what
Geiger articulates-that the breaching party intended to injure the creditor or
that the injury was substantially certain to occur.15 7 Such a definition of willful
158
broadens the scope of conduct under § 523(a)(6) to include nontortious acts.
154. See id. at 345 ("The Court has embarked upon its own literacy campaign, seeking to
read most of the post-Geiger cases which in any way analyze the § 523(a)(6) standards, and
especially those which relate to the tort of 'conversion' within the parameters of those
standards.").
155. See In re Jacobs, 381 B.R. 128, 139 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) (discussing the
importance of courts being able to use § 523(a)(6) to be able to catch all wrongful debts and
except them from discharge).
156. See id ("There is surprisingly little judicial and scholarly commentary discussing the
degree or nature of 'wrongfulness' that constitutes 'malice' under § 523(a)(6)."); see also
Whiters, 337 B.R. at 345 ("[F]ederal bankruptcy courts are not supposed to make the law
themselves; rather, they are to apply the law as it has been established by courts of higher
authority.").
157. See In re Keaty, 397 F.3d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[Elither objective substantial
certainty [of injury] or subjective motive [to injure] meets the Supreme Court's definition of
'willful ... injury' in § 523(a)(6)."); see also supra note 114 (noting that courts interpreting
willful after Geiger argue over whether "willful" requires a wholly subjective inquiry or if it
could be satisfied objectively by analyzing the circumstances surrounding the act).
158. See In re Williams, 337 F.3d 504, 510 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[D]ischargeability of
contractual debts under [§] 523(a)(6) depends upon the knowledge and intent of the debtor at
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The danger of allowing courts greater flexibility is that courts will include
knowing breaches of contract within the scope of § 523(a)(6).15 9 Geiger,
however, intended to prevent § 523(a)(6) from including debts resulting from
reckless behavior.' 6 0 Requiring that an injury, in order to be "willful," need
only be substantially certain to cause injury presents courts with the opportunity
to devolve into the old and rejected Tinker standard' 66 1-finding debts "willful
and malicious" if the act that caused the injury was deliberate and necessarily
caused injury.162 Such a result clearly would be in direct opposition to the
principle decided in Geiger-the injury to the debtor must be intentional and
63
not the result of reckless conduct.1
In order to make sure a knowing breach of contract is not included within
the scope of § 523(a)(6), in jurisdictions that do not require that an intentional
tort accompany the breach of contract, the term "malicious" must require that
the conduct be the type of wrongful conduct the provision is meant to except.
While a knowing breach of contract may be considered willful (because the
debtor knew breaching the contract would result in financial harm to the
creditor), whether or not the breach of contract is excepted from discharge
depends on the court's definition of malicious.
As noted in Part 1II.13.1, jurisdictions require either specific malice or
implied malice. '6 Similar to the analysis in jurisdictions that require
the time of the breach, rather than whether conduct is classified as a tort.").
159. See Lockerby v. Sierra, 535 F.3d 1038,1042 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that § 523(a)(6)
does not include knowing breaches of contract). The court specifically stated:
That the Supreme Court in Geiger assumed that § 523(a)(6) encompassed only
intentional torts, not intentional breaches of contract, strongly suggests the Court
would not approve of a definition of 'tortious conduct' that would include
intentional breaches of contract whenever it is substantially certain that the breach
will cause injury.
Id
160. See supra note 1 10 and accompanying text (noting the discussion in Geiger regarding
the evils that result from including reckless and negligent conduct within the scope of
§ 523(a)(6)).
161. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (discussing Congress's rejection of the
definition of "willful and malicious" found in Tinker).
162. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text (discussing the interpretations of
"willful and malicious" after the Supreme Court's decision in Tinkerthat required onlyrecless,
but not intentional wrongdoing).
163. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text (discussing how the decision in
Geiger was supposed to eliminate from the scope of § 523(a)(6) injuries caused by reckless
conduct).
164. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text (defining specific malice as requiring
a subjective intent to harm a creditor and implied malice as requiring only that the act
objectively be deemed wrongful based on the surrounding circumstances).
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intentional torts, courts in jurisdictions that do not require an intentional tort
generally do not require specific malice 16 5 -that the debtor specifically
intended to harm the creditor when breaching a contract.16 6 In a breach of
contract scenario, the breaching party usually cannot meet the demands of the
contract because of a tough financial situation, not because of any ill will
toward a creditor.167 Requiring that the debtor, in breaching a contract,
intended to harm the creditor is impractical.
Also, in jurisdictions that do not require an intentional tort to accompany a
breach of contract, it may be more difficult to analyze a breach of contract by
focusing on the breaching party's subjective state of mind.168 When an
intentional tort is required, the breaching party already had some sort of
culpable state of mind to commit the intentional tort.'16 9 Reexamining the state
of mind of a tortfeasor is not a difficult task.'170 In a breach of contract scenario,
however, contract law does not traditionally accommodate a state of mind
inquiry.'17 ' Instead of attempting to justify the personal reasons behind why
each party breaches a contractual agreement, courts that do not require an
intentional tort examine the circumstances surrounding the breach to determine
7
whether the breach was wrongful.1 1
Shifting focus from the subjective intentions of the breaching party to the
unfortunate circumstances surrounding the creditor is dangerous because in a
breach of contract scenario, there is no clear definition of what outcomes are
wrongful, and focusing too much on the creditor's unfortunate circumstances
can distract the court from the main issue-whether the debtor acted
165. See, e.g., Hambley, 329 B.R. at 402 (stating that a malicious injury is a wrongful
injury, but that malicious does not require spite or ill-will toward the creditor).
166. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (defining "malicious" in implied malice
jurisdictions).
167. See suipra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (describing the impracticality of
requiring specific malice when analyzing conduct accompanying a breach of contract under
§ 523(a)(6)).
168. See supranotes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of contract law
to accommodate a state of mind inquiry).
169. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (listing several intentional torts and their
state of mind requirements).
170. See supra notes 133-34 and accompanying text (discussing the ease of applying a
specific malice inquiry when courts require an intentional tort to accompany a breach of
contract).
171. See supranote 55 and accompanying text (discussing contract law's focus in a breach
of contract scenario on the actions of the breach but not on the breaching parties' intentions).
172. See, e.g., In re Ahmied, 359 B.R. 34, 42 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Malice may be
implied from 'the acts and conduct of the debtor in the context of [the] surrounding
circumstances."' (quoting In re Stelluti, 94 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1996))).
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wrongfully. To illustrate these dangers, consider two differing interpretations
of implied malice: (1) courts under the Second Circuit define malice to require
7
aggravated conduct and a conscious disregard of one's own societal duties;1 1
while (2) courts under the Fifth Circuit mash the meanings of willful and
malicious together to require only the language specified in Geiger-an
74
intentional injury.'1

Regarding interpretation (1), courts in the Second Circuit require: conduct
causing injury to the creditor under some aggravating circumstance;
and conduct in conscious disregard of one's commonly accepted duties.175
Something more culpable than a substantially certain injury is required-the
conduct must demonstrate an aggravating circumstance. The "conscious
disregard" language, however, does not seem to require more than
recklessness-the debtor need not subjectively intend to injure the creditor so
long as the injury was substantially certain to occur and the breach of contract
was found to be in conscious disregard of one's duties.17 6 Therefore, in order
to be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6), conduct accompanying a
breach of contract must cause injury to the creditor under some aggravating
circumstance.
The phrase "some aggravating circumstance," however, is vague and will
be difficult to distinguish from case to case. To illustrate this point, look at the
following examples and consider which seem to be more aggravated and,
therefore, deserving of exception from discharge: (a) the debtor defaulted on
one payment but did not return the investment as instructed under the
agreement because the debtor believed the business eventually would turn a
profit-the business never turned a profit and the investor lost all of the
investment;177 (b) the con tractor-debtor failed to use payments as specified
under a contract to build a house for the creditor while still intending to build
173. See, e.g., In re Hambley, 329 B.R. 382, 402 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Malice 'is
implied when anyone of reasonable intelligence knows that the act in question is contrary to
commonly accepted duties in the ordinary relationships among people, and injurious to
another."' (quoting United Orient Bank v. Green, 215 B.R. 916, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1997))).
174. See, e.g., In re Williams, 337 F.3d 504, 509 (5th Cir. 2003) ("The test for willful and
malicious injury under [§] 523(a)(6), thus, is condensed into a single inquiry of whether there
exists 'either an objective substantial certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm' on
the part of the debtor.").
175. See Hambley, 329 B.R. at 402 (describing implied malice as both a conscious
disregard of one's duties and an injury to a creditor under some aggravating circumstances).
176. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of "conscious
disregard" language in jurisdictions requiring an intentional tort accompany breach of contract).
177. See Hambley, 329 B.R. at 388-94 (discussing the financial scenario that caused the
debtor to breach contract). In this case, the debt was excepted from discharge under
§ 523(a)(6). Id at 389.
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the house as specified by the creditor-the debtor went insolvent and could not
build the house as specified;178 (c) the debtor sold off all the value on a truck
serving as collateral for a loan due to financial hard times with the intent of
restoring the value of the truck-the debtor defaulted on the loan and the
creditor had nothing to which to attach its security interest because the debtor
sold off all the truck's value. 179 The lack of a clear standard makes it difficult
to discern which situations are more wrongful than others. For the most part,
courts determine whether conduct is excepted under § 523(a)(6) by deciding on
their own, without guidance from the Code, what constitutes wrongful
conduct.'180 Such a lack of clarity makes it difficult to predict how a court will
decide a fact pattern until after the decision is handed down.
Regarding interpretation (2), the Fifth Circuit does not read "willful and
8
malicious" separately. Instead, the court combines the terms together.'1 '
Therefore, under this reading, in order for conduct accompanying a breach of
contract to be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6), the debtor must have
either subjectively intended to injure the creditor or acted in such a way that
was substantially certain to harm the creditor.18 2 Furthermore, the Fifth Circuit
acknowledged that, under its reading, a knowing breach of contract could fall
within the scope of § 523(a)(6) as long as the breaching party acted in a way
83
substantially certain to injure the creditor.1
The immediate problem, similar to that existing in the Second Circuit, is a
lack of any standard that identifies the conduct accompanying a knowing
breach of contract as more wrongful than other conduct. When a debtor fails to
make payments under a loan agreement, the debtor normally does so believing
178. See In re Bren, 284 B.R. 681, 686-89 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2002) (discussing the
financial scenario that caused debtor to use funds for purposes in contradiction to security
agreement). In this case, in a specific malice jurisdiction that required an intentional tort, the
debt was not excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6). Id at 699.
179. See In re Gagle, 230 B.R. 174, 176-78 (Bankr. D. Utah) (discussing the debtor's
financial situation that caused him to sell off parts of his truck in breach of a security
agreement). I this case, in an implied malice jurisdiction requiring an intentional tort, the court
excepted the injury from discharge under § 523(a)(6). Id at 183.
180. See supra notes 154, 156 and accompanying text (discussing the statement in In re
Whiters that judges are making decisions based on their own thoughts without giving heed to
the words of § 523(a)(6)).
181. See In re Williams, 337 F.3d 504, 509 (5th Cu. 2003) ("This definition of implied
malice is identical to the Kawaauhau Court's explanation of a willful injury.").
182. See id. ("The test for willful and malicious injury under [§] 523(a)(6), thus, is
condensed into a single inquiry of whether there exists 'either an objective substantial certainty
of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm' on the part of the debtor.").
183. See id. at 5 10 ("The Fifth Circuit has acknowledged that a breach of contract may
involve an intentional or substantially certain injury.").
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that such a failure is substantially certain to harm the creditor-an
unreimbursed lender suffers a financial injury. 184 Because a knowing breach of
contract alone is not enough to fall within the scope of § 523(a)(6), an
additional element requiring wrongdoing under § 523(a)(6) is needed.18' No
such narrowing language exists under the Fifth Circuit's interpretation, and so,
once again, the courts have complete discretion to decide what debts are
wrongful and excepted from discharge.
The lack of a meaningful standard presents an additional problem. The
purpose of § 523(a)(6) is to except from discharge only those debts resulting
from wrongful acts. 186 The focus is on the wrongful actor-a debtor who
wrongfully commits an injury should not be allowed to escape the
consequences by filing for bankruptcy. The Fifth Circuit, however, does not
require any subjective wrongdoing; as stated above, a knowing breach of
contract almost always is certain to injure the creditor. 88' A court, under this
standard, could except a debt from discharge not because the debtor acted
wrongfully, but because the court sympathizes with the creditor's situation.
Such a reading strays from the Code's goal of allowing honest and good faith
debtors to start anew.' 88 Without any finding of specific wrongdoing on the
part of the debtor, a court should not be able to except a debt from discharge
under § 523(a)(6).
While the standards in the Fifth Circuit and Second Circuit differ, both
readings of "willful and malicious" suffer from a lack of clarity. When trying to
find willful and malicious injuries in a breach of contract scenario without first
finding an intentional tort, courts are forced to look at the surrounding
circumstances and make a judgment based on whether the outcome resulting
from the breach seems wrong. Unless the standard is clarified, it appears that
debtors breaching a contract in these jurisdictions will be at the whim of the

184. See In re Kidd, 219 B.R. 278,284 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1998) (noting that the difficulty
in the breach of contract scenario "is that rarely are the debtors acting out of a desire to injure
the creditors, even though the injury to the creditor, although not desired, is almost always
substantially certain to result from a debtor's actions").
185. See Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 62 (1998) (commenting that a knowing
breach of contract is not meant to be within the scope of § 523(a)(6)).
186. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of § 523(a)(6) as
restricting discharge to the honest, good faith debtor).
187. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (noting that the problem in breach of
contract scenarios is that the breaching party usually is substantially certain that the breach will
result in injury).
188. See supranote 7 and accompanying text (discussing the Bankruptcy Code's purpose
of giving honest, but unfortunate, debtors a fresh start).
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courts more so than debtors in a jurisdiction requiring an intentional tort
because of the lack of guidance and structure existing in the law.
3. Conclusion: Effect of Varying Interpretations
To illustrate the effect of the unclear and conflicting interpretations of
"willful and malicious" post-Geiger, it is appropriate to return to the
hypothetical in Part 1. Leslie wants to know what will happen in a bankruptcy
proceeding if she takes out a loan to start a sole proprietorship but fails to make
payments on the loan because the business becomes insolvent. While the
lawyer initially would want to tell Leslie that bankruptcy could wipe out all of
the debts resulting from the failing business, the lawyer would have to consider
whether § 523(a)(6) applied to any debts.
Leslie would want to know under what circumstances her debts would be
excepted as willful and malicious injuries, specifically those debts arising from
a breach of Leslie's loan agreement. In response to such an inquiry, the lawyer
would have to spend a great deal of time researching the decisions under
§ 523(a)(6). Of course, the lawyer's job would be easiest in a jurisdiction
requiring an intentional tort and subjective intent to harm the creditor, but that
sort of jurisdiction is rare.1" 9
Leslie most likely will be in an implied malice jurisdiction. If such a
jurisdiction requires that an intentional tort accompany the breach in contract,
then Leslie's lawyer has an easier task. The initial advice would be simple:
"Leslie, do not commit an intentional tort." If Leslie knew that she could be
liable for conversion if she breached her loan agreement,190 then Leslie would
want to know what sorts of intentional torts are wrongful enough to fall within
the scope of § 523(a)(6). The lawyer, again, would not be able to articulate a
clear standard. The tort would have to require some sort of aggravated conduct,
but the requisite degree of culpability would remain uncertain.' 9 ' Still, at least
Leslie would know that in order for her breach even to be eligible under
§ 523(a)(6), the conduct accompanying the breach must constitute an
intentional tort.

189. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text (discussing the impracticalities
inherent in applying a specific malice standard).
190. See supra note 141 and accompanying text (listing cases that involved conversion in a
breach of contract scenario).
191. See supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text (noting that standards used to
articulate what in addition to an intentional tort is required under § 523(a)(6) are unclear).
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In an implied malice jurisdiction that does not require an intentional tort,
Leslie's lawyer will not have much luck explaining exactly what a court
requires to accompany the breach of contract. The lawyer would have to admit
that being unable to make payments under a loan agreement or security
agreement most likely will result in a knowing breach of contract in which
harm is substantially certain to befall the creditor.192 This satisfies "willful"
under this type of jurisdiction. 91 3 If the circumstances surrounding the injury
imply that the injury to the creditor was wrongful, then without any subjective
intent to harm the creditor, Leslie's conduct could be deemed wrongful and the
resulting debt excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6). The lawyer also
would not be able to articulate any clear standard for what outcomes resulting
from a breach usually are wrongful. The analysis is entirely fact specific with
great discretion given to the court. For the lawyer to render any effective
advice, Leslie would have to hop into a time machine, determine the specific
factual scenario in which she breaches the contract, and then return to the
94
lawyer and allow the lawyer to take a guess as to what the court would do.'1
Even then, after time travel, any advice given to Leslie about whether the debt
would be excepted would not be fully accurate because one judge that hears the
case might be more sympathetic to the creditor than another.
Overall, then, the lawyer cannot, in any jurisdiction, give an accurate
articulation of what § 523(a)(6) requires. Such a result is disparaging because
Leslie will want to know if she can use bankruptcy to shed her honest debts and
arise from insolvency afresh. The Code was written so that the debtor, absent
wrongful conduct, can do so. Without clear boundaries for courts to abide by,
potential entrepreneurs like Leslie probably will be more hesitant to consider
bankruptcy as an option and more hesitant to start businesses.
IV. Clarifying "Willful and Malicious Injury to Property"
Under § 523(a)(6)
Due to the vast and overwhelming variety of different interpretations
regarding "willful and malicious" under § 523(a)(6), there is a need for a
unifying definition to lend more predictability and clarity to the statute. This
192. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (noting that a knowing breach of contract
results in the debtor being substantially certain that injury will befall the creditor).
193. See In re Williams, 337 F.3d 504, 5 10 (5th Cir. 2003) ("[A] knowing breach of a clear
contractual obligation that is certain to cause injury may prevent discharge under [§] 523(a)(6),
regardless of the existence of separate tortious; conduct.").
194. See supra notes 154, 156 and accompanying text (noting that judges often make their
own decisions on what they think should be excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6)).
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Part offers a solution regarding the sort of breach of contract that should be
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6) and defends that solution as the best
alternative to solve the lack of clarity surrounding the statute.
A. Conduct Accompanying a Breach of Contract Must Be a Tort
Defined by State Law
As noted in Part HI, confusion results when a tort-like state of mind inquiry
is used to evaluate a breach of contract scenario. In a 2008 opinion, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals specifically commented on the problems that result in
application of § 523(a)(6) to breaches of contract:
Historically, injuries resulting from breaches of contract are treated very
differently from injuries resulting from torts. In contract law, "[t]he motive
for the breach comnmonly is immaterial in an action on the contract." The
concept of "efficient breach" is built into our system of contracts, with the
understanding that people will sometimes intentionally break their contracts
for no other reason than that it benefits them financially. The definition of
intent to injure as the commission of an act "substantially certain"95to cause
harm was born from tort principles, not contract law principles.1
The breach of contract analysis in a § 523(a)(6) inquiry also tends to undermine
the bankruptcy policy of giving debtors a fresh start by presenting courts with
an opportunity to except from discharge intentional breaches of contract instead
96
of the intended result-excepting intentional injuries.1
The solution suggested by the Ninth Circuit, 197 and the one this Note
adopts, mandates that the conduct accompanying a breach must constitute an
98
intentional tort as defined by the state in which the proceeding is brought.,
The reasons for such a solution are threefold: (1) such a rule creates a clear
interpretation for courts and clients to follow; (2) requiring a state-defined tort
most adequately addresses the purpose of § 523(a)(6)-excepting debts that

195. Lockerby v. Sierra, 535 F.3d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted).
196. See id ("Expanding the scope of § 523(a)(6) to include contracts that are intentionally
breached whenever it is substantially certain that injury will occur would severely circumscribe
the ability of debtors to 'start afresh."').
197. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing the success ofjurisdictions that
require that an intentional tort accompany a breach of contract before excepting the injury from
discharge under § 523(a)(6)--a clearer standard of what conduct is wrongful when defined by
tort law).
198. See Lockerby, 535 F.3d at 1041 (noting that in order for a breach of contract to be
excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6), the breach must be accompanied by conduct that
"1constitutes a tort under state law").
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result from wrongful conduct;'199 and (3) allowing § 523(a)(6) to extend to the
breach of contract scenario is consistent with the current rule of not requiring
an independent tort outside of the breach of contract scenario.2 0 While some
may view this solution as overly restrictive of courts, it is beneficial because
courts will be limited to the tort law framework used for the purpose of
wrongful conduct, thereby keeping § 523(a)(6) consistent with its purpose;20
and the restrictions add to the statute's clarity, making the administration of
§ 523(a)(6) more predictable.
B. Defining "Malicious" in the Breach of ContractScenario to Require an
Intentional Tort Eligiblefor Punitive Damages
With the term "willful" requiring that an intentional tort accompany a
breach of contract, the meaning of the term "malicious" must be clarified. As
already mentioned in Part III.D. 1, in implied malice jurisdictions that already
require an intentional tort, the language used to definie malicious is imported
from pre-Geiger decisions, which do not add much to the post-Geiger
definition of "willful." Although the interpretation of malicious that required
aggravated conduct in addition to the intentional tort gave malicious meaning,
the degree of aggravation required remained uncertain. On the other hand,
requiring, as specific malice jurisdictions require, that the breaching party
intend the injury to the specific creditor narrows the scope of § 523(a)(6) too
much. A solution to this problem must clarify what is required in addition to an
intentional tort that will make conduct accompanying a breach of contract
wrongful enough to be within the scope of § 523(a)(6) while still capturing
wrongful intentional torts in breach of contract scenarios.
Because the purpose of § 523(a)(6) is to except wrongful acts from
discharge, 0 the best place to look for a rule on how to determine what
constitutes a wrongful act is tort law.2 0 Tort law compensates the injured party
199. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing rationale in Lockerby that
§ 523(a)(6) was meant to except intentional injuries and not intentional breaches of contract).
200. See supra note 124 and accompanying text (discussing well-accepted principle that an
independent tort existing regardless of a contractual scenario is not required under § 523(a)(6)).
201. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (noting that § 523(a)(6) was passed to
except intentional injuries from discharge-a concept best addressed by tort law).
202. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code's exceptions to discharge and specifically the purpose of § 523(a)(6)'s
exception of debts caused by "willfuil and malicious" conduct).
203. See supra Part IL.B (discussing the origins and purposes of contract and tort law and
explaining why punitive damages are issued in tort but normally not in contract).
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in an amount equal to the damages resulting from the injury. 204 Tort law also
deters the commission of wrongful torts by adding punitive damages on top of
the compensatory award. 0
Does § 523(a)(6) except from discharge debts caused by willful or
malicious injury to compensate the injured, punish and deter the wrongful
debtor, or both? While it may seem that the purpose of keeping the wrongful
injury on the books is to both punish the debtor and make sure that the injured
creditor is made whole, it is arguable that the main focus of § 523(a)(6) is on
punishment and deterrence. Courts debating § 523(a)(6) focus on the
principles of equity-deterring the abuse of bankruptcy law by those who

would commit these wrongful injuries without any repercussion .206

If

§ 523(a)(6) seeks to deter and punish those debtors who wrongfully inflict
injuries, instead of carving a new path in the case law, bankruptcy courts
should follow tort law devices for punishment and deterrence.
Under tort law, to determine whether punitive damages should be
awarded, states usually require that the tort involve an aggravated act or

heightened sense of culpability. 207 Only wanton and vile acts are subject to
punitive damages. Based on the purpose of § 523(a)(6), it is those same
wanton and vile acts that the Bankruptcy Code wishes to except from
discharge. 0 Therefore, when determining whether the tort accompanying a
breach of contract is "malicious," the bankruptcy court should inquire as
follows: If an intentional tort accompanying a breach of contract is eligible for
punitive damages under state law, then such conduct is "malicious" under
§ 523(a)(6) and the resulting debt is excepted from discharge.

204. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the compensatory purpose of
tort damages).
205. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text (explaining that tort law, unlike
contract law, allows for the awarding of punitive damages to deter and punish tortfeasors).
206. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (noting that the purpose of giving the court
the power to investigate the circumstances surrounding a breach in contract is to limit discharge
to the honest but unfortunate debtor).
207. See supra note 53 and accompanying text (defining what is required in order for an
award of punitive damages to be appropriate).
208. See, e.g., In re Jacobs, 381 B.R. 128, 139 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2008) (requiring
aggravated conduct for a finding of malice); In re Logue, 294 B.R. 59, 63 (B.A.P. 8th Cir.
2003) ("The debtor's knowledge that he or she is violating the creditor's legal rights is
insufficient to establish 'malice' absent some additional aggravated circumstances.").
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C. Critiques and Defenses of the New Rule

Opponents of the proposed definition of malicious most likely will assert
that the rule takes away all the discretion bankruptcy courts have to craft equitable
solutions to the complex problems resulting from breaches of contract. The
current state of the law allows judges to decide on a case-by-case basis what is
wrongful, and a definition requiring punitive damages denies judges that
That argument, however, seems to support the proposed definition. The
definition prohibits the courts only from excepting from discharge those debts that
are not supposed to be excepted-specifically, intentional breaches of contract
that recklessly or negligently, but not intentionally, injure the creditor.2 1
Excepting only those debts in a contract scenario that include punitive damages
limits the application of § 523(a)(6) to wrongfuil acts. Indeed, some jurisdictions
already interpret malicious as requiring aggravated conduct or highly culpable
acts .2 1 '1The new definition would make the job of the bankruptcy court easier by
having state courts or federal trial courts in tort actions essentially mark those
decisions eligible for exception to discharge by awarding punitive damages. If
the case has not been decided by a trial court, the bankruptcyjudge at least could
look to the body of state tort law already in existence and see whether the conduct
in question would be eligible for punitive damages. Either way, the bankruptcy
court would not have to do the trial court's job of assessing an alleged tort claim
for wrongful conduct.
Most importantly, judicial flexibility is maintained. That flexibility would
not lie with the bankruptcy judge, but with a state or federal district court that
hears tort actions, knows the state law on those actions, knows which torts contain
aggravated conduct, and therefore, is more capable of making the determination
that certain conduct accompanying a breach constitutes a wrongful intentional
tort. 22Trial

courts adlegislators have flexibility: Legislators cncraft cassof

action for bad faith/wrongful breaches of contract 21" and trial courts can evaluate

209. See Jacobs, 381 B.R. at 139 ("Perhaps the analysis is best understood as an expression
of the fundamental policy underlying the bankruptcy discharge: [O]f providing a fresh start
only to the 'honest but unfortunate debtor."' (citations omitted)).
210. See supra Part III.B (discussing the evolution of the interpretation of"willful" from
requiring only an intentional act to requiring an intent to injure).
211. See supra note 146 (listing a jurisdiction that requires aggravated conduct for the
injury to be "malicious" under § 523(a)(6)).

Cf., e.g.,

212.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONLIuCT OF LAWS

§ 145(l) (197 1) ("The rights

and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the
state.

... .

213.

See Cavico, supra note 24, at 381 ("Punitive damages are imposed for a breach in
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a case arising under such a cause of action and determine that the conduct
associated with a breach of contract was aggravated enough to warrant punitive
damages. 1 Even if the state does not have a tort cause of action for a bad faith
breach of contract, conversion is a common intentional tort in which punitive
damages are available. 1 Some flexibility still is retained.
Opponents, however, most likely will respond that in many situations
involving willful and malicious injuries to property, the debtor files for
bankruptcy before a judgment can be awarded on the tort claim (or maybe even
before the claim is filed). The automatic stay provision in the Bankruptcy Code
stops all state court proceedings, and any proceeding on a pre-petition debt would
be put on pause.2 1 Opponents may argue that injuries never will be marked by
state court proceedings, so requiring that injuries be eligible for punitive damages
under state law accomplishes nothing--bankruptcy courts still will have to make
circumstantial, fact-based decisions.
This argument fails for two reasons. First, the argument fails to realize that
this problem is a valuation problem-that is, this situation of waiting for a
judgment to see whether there are punitive damages is no different than when
parties are depending on state court judgments on existing tort proceedings to
determine the amount of debts owed. The solution under the Code for valuation
problems is to have the bankruptcy court lift the stay so that the tort claims can be
valued, or, if the state court proceeding would unduly delay the bankruptcy

proceeding, make the calculation by

itself.217

The same analysis should be

applied to possible punitive damages in a tortjudgment. In some cases in which a
creditor filed a tort action, the bankruptcy court could lift the stay on the state
proceeding and allow a determination on the judgment.

contract when the breach constitutes or amounts to a separate and distinct independent tort, the
commission of which is sufficiently aggravated.").
214. See In reJercich, 238 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Outside the area ofinsurance
contracts, tort recovery for the bad faith breach of contract is permitted only when, 'in addition
to the breach of the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] a defendant's conduct violates a
fundamental public policy ofthe state.' (quoting Rattan v. United Sen's. Auto Ass'n, 10 1 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 6, 11 (Cal. App. 2000))).
215. See RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(2) (1979) (containing no limitations on
the torts in which punitive damages are eligible).
216. See 11IU.S.C. § 362(a)( 1) (2006) (subjecting to automatic stay those proceedings that
have been brought or could have been brought before commencement of bankruptcy case).
217. See id § 502(c) (allowing the bankruptcy court to estimate unliquidated claims if the
fixing would "unduly delay the administration of the case"); see also In re Baldwin-United
Corp., 57 B.R. 751, 758 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (suggesting in a Chapter 11I case that the estimated
value may provide a ceiling on the claim, but that estimation may be for the purposes of
confirmation and voting but not for distribution).
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Second, even though bankruptcy courts might still have to decide whether
some intentional torts meet the requirements for punitive damages under state
law, state tort law precedent would serve as a guide to bankruptcy courts.
Potential debtors would be able to predict the sort of conduct excepted under
§ 523(a)(6) and lawyers would have a better idea on how to advise their clients.
Even appellate courts reviewing decisions of bankruptcy courts would be better
off because appellate courts could evaluate the lower courts' decisions based on
case law instead of gut-feelings. Because bankruptcy courts would have an
established doctrine of law to follow when excepting a debt from discharge under
§ 523(a)(6), this infinitely increases the clarity of what is required under a willful
and malicious standard. 1
V Conclusion
Returning to the hypothetical situation in which Leslie is seeking legal
advice, under the proposed solution, Leslie's attorney will have an easier job
communicating the types of debts that are excepted from discharge under
§ 523(a)(6). Leslie's attorney can tell her that only when her conduct amounts to
a tort under state law can the resulting injury be excepted from discharge. Next,
Leslie's attorney can explain the certain torts that might arise under a contractual
scenario-conversion, fraud, embezzlement, etc. The attorney can advise Leslie
as to what conduct from which she should refrain in order to avoid committing
any of those torts. That explanation is much clearer than telling Leslie that she
better not do anything that is substantially certain to lead to injury-Leslie, after
all, is no mind reader!
After explaining the torts, the attorney can further ease Leslie's fears by
explaining that even if an intentional tort is found, in order for the resulting debt
to be excepted from discharge, the possible damages for the tort must include
punitive damages. The attorney could use past state law decisions involving torts
such as fraud or conversion to demonstrate when punitive damages were eligible.
This provides a much clearer picture for Leslie to use than attempting to predict
the bankruptcy court's sentiments toward a particular set of facts. While helping
Leslie, the clarification also tells bankruptcy courts more precisely where the
§ 523(a)(6) boundaries are. With this clarification, the Bankruptcy Code truly
will offer Leslie the opportunity for a fresh start.

218. See supra notes 154, 156 and accompanying text (discussing the judge's decision in
In re Whiters, specifically pointing out the argument that under § 523(a)(6) judges are making
up their own law based on what they feel is right).

